Chapter
4
Values
and
Related
Matters[1]
All
experience hath shown, that mankind are more
disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right
themselves by
abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.
The
Declaration of
Independence
Now that we have
looked at our political animal both as a
unit and as part of the group, we will examine the elements by which a
group
and its members identify themselves. We are setting out to answer the
question
posed in our last chapter: What is a norm? But before dealing with
norms, we
have to study those elements which provide bases for them. Norms are
related to
values, and values are elemental to group life and political
organization. In
this and subsequent chapters we will deal with values and the matters
intertwined with them. Even their occasional segregations emphasize
their
relationships. If we divide this chapter and those that follow into
different
sections we do not intend to compartmentalize the topics, but simply to
ventilate the study. Each section is titled according to the nucleus of
its
topic, although the areas shade and fade into each other.
I.
Interests
Discussing man and his
groups, we found reasons for his
social behavior. For example, man is driven to provide for his basic
physiological, psychological and sociological needs. When he is hungry
he needs
to eat, when he is tired he needs rest, when he is confined he needs
freedom,
and when he is bondless he needs attachment. All along he has
"needs," which are flexible, retractable and expandable. The yogi of
India can live on an almond a day, while the Western man reaches for
the moon.
Within this span some needs may seem more justifiable than others.
Caught in a
blizzard, a man needs shelter lest he not survive. That need is
imperative, while
the desire of the owner of a comfortable suburban house to upgrade his
dwelling
into a mansion may be considered dispensable. You may notice the word
"need" in one case and "desire" in the other. Although the
two terms are used interchangeably, we may establish, on the basis of
their
connotation, a spectrum ranging from necessities to frivolities. This
semantic
acrobatic will reveal a distinction between the insufficiency of a need
and the
relatively mire comfortable position from which a desire is formulated.
In the
first, the entity in search of its needs may be desperate to acquire
them, yet
handicapped in obtaining them because of their very absence. In the
second,
comparatively abundant means may make the desirable end more
accessible. In the
latter situation, accessibility may relax the drive toward procurement
of the
goal; it may create a tendency to conserve the available means and slow
down
the move toward the goal or it may augment the desirous appetite. In
political
terms, these situations may be illustrated on one hand by the
unfavorable yet
militant position of a disinherited group, class or nation, and on the
other
hand by the powerful position yet conservative or rapacious attitude of
the
propertied.
There is, of course,
no clear dichotomy between need and
desire, and one term turns into the other depending on social context.
Our
example of the man who desires to replace his comfortable suburban home
with a
mansion illustrates the point. Many people may consider him in need.
If, for
example, he has been promoted to the presidency of an important firm,
he may
have to reside in a mansion to fulfill the social obligations attached
to his
position. As it is in the interest of the man caught in a blizzard to
find
shelter, so is it in the interest of our executive and his firm to
acquire a
mansion. These interests provide
functional spheres making life and social life possible. Interests
interpret,
convert and qualify individual needs in social terms. The chief of the
tribe,
the king, the president, the commissar, or the tycoon is treated
according to
the customs and expectations of his position in his group context. The
group
discriminates among its members and establishes gradations of
expectations on
the basis of differentiation and identification. When corresponding to
the
group's fermentations and dynamics, these gradations blend into the
acceptable
social pattern. When we talk about "self-interest" or "national
interest," we are referring to functional spheres believed expedient
for
survival. I was tempted to say "well-being" instead of
"survival," for it is a question not of mere existence, but of its
quality. In Aristotelian terms, Polis
did not come about only for the sake of life, but for the sake of the good life.[2] The concept of good; of course, is in itself
relative; what is good depends on who is formulating it where and when.
But man
claims the faculty of choice, and that implies a scale of preferences.
Although we have
elaborated no hierarchy of preferences,
an order of importance may be inferred, with the immediate needs for
survival,
such as food or shelter, preceding others. The proposition is obviously
elementary. We noticed in earlier chapters that man, like some other
animals,
may renounce his food or his rest in the face of danger. In fact, the
history
of mankind is filled with instances, like-that of the Japanese
Kamikaze, where
men have thrown their vary lives onto scales where self-conservation
did not
weigh the heavier. The loci of security and conservation are at times
displaced
from individual security to preservation of the group, nation, empire,
fatherland, principles, religion or whatever the cause of the
sacrifice. In the
words of Tillich:
Man,
like every living being, is
concerned about many things, above all about those which condition his
very
existence, such as food and shelter. But man, in contrast to other
living
beings, has spiritual concerns-cognitive, aesthetic, social, political.
Some of
them are urgent, often extremely urgent, and each of them as well as
the vital
concerns can claim ultimacy for a human life or the life of a social
group. If
it claims ultimacy it demands the total surrender of him who accepts
this
claim, and it promises total fulfillment even if all other claims have
to be
subjected to it or rejected in its name. If a national group makes the
life and
growth of the nation its ultimate concern, it demands that all other
concerns,
economic well-being health and life, family, aesthetic and cognitive
truth,
justice and humanity, be sacrificed.[3]
Faced with the choice,
man may prefer to die rather than
renounce his country, creed or belief.
The situation is, of course, unlikely. Man is not usually faced
with
such extreme choices, and when faced with them many prefer to live. But
as long
as the ultimate is not present, many will pretend to believe in
sacrifices they
re-ally would not be prepared to make. However, man is
faced with choices, and in making them he simultaneously
conforms with and helps establish a scale of preferences in which his
very being,
although indeed essential, may not always occupy first place.
If so, then is it that
life and what is good for it are
not the key to man’s preferential scale? We may start to answer the
question by
trying to detect differences in the nature of the situations we have so
far
illustrated. Recalling the affectional-functional model in the last
chapter,
with its extremes of emotional and state-of-nature or mechanical
rationales, we
may notice that what was described as the interest
of the newly elected executive to upgrade his domicile could, in the
appropriate group context, correspond to certain functional dimensions
of
social relations.
On the other hand, it
would be difficult to explain the
functionality of an individual’s or a group’s sacrifice of its
well-being and
even its very existence to defend an ideal. The term “interest” does
not seem
to justify fully the Kamikaze’s behavior: hitting a battleship in a
live bomb
is hardly good for his health. The Manichean Colonies of the
Mediterranean
Basin in the seventh century who refused to renounce their belief were
wiped
out by the Christians, who themselves a few centuries earlier had
braved the
teeth of the lions. Such behavior does not seem materially and
functionally
motivated, but nonrational and affectional. Yet, although abstract, it
overlaps
and competes with the concrete and material phenomena we have termed
interests.
In the scale of preferences, it arises from values
as distinct from “valuables.” When the believer donates his fortune to
his
church, he parts with his valuables for his values. Without attempting
a
watertight compartmentation, we may reasonably propose that while
interests are
based more on functional-rational considerations, values appear to
pertain to
the affectional, non-material dimensions of human behavior. But the
distinction
should be applied with caution, as interests and values merge and
generate and
justify each other.[4]
II.
Interest-Value
Insularity
We can distinguish
interests from values by their degree
of finitude. An interest, such as the need for shelter in a blizzard or
a
bigger mansion for the executive, can be identified, formulated,
strived for,
attained and finally consummated. Once a shelter is found or a bigger
mansion
procured, the end is reached. While other similar interests may arise
in time
for the same people, they will all be separately definable in
means-ends terms.
But values like love, patriotism and piety are not attainable once and
for all.
The Kamikaze’s ultimate goal was not to be blown to pieces on the
impact of his
bomb with the battleship, nor did the Buddhist monk burn himself in
Saigon
during the Vietnam War for the pleasure of seeing flames flare about
him. The
goal is beyond the act and, because of the very act, beyond the actors.
Values
that imply finite ends eventually fall into the functional category and
are
therefore closer to interests. A value, such as honesty, must
continuously be
affirmed. You cannot make a balance sheet of your honesty and say, “I
have
attained it,” and from then on become fraudulent. An act of faith does
not
absolve the actor of his faith, but merely manifests the belief that
lies
beyond and that continues even after the act is over. A lover cannot
fold his
arms after a gesture of affection and wait for reciprocity from his
partner. If
he does, he is not loving but doing business. In contrast to
functionally
definable interests, values lie in the affectional sphere. They are
values
because they can only be approximated functionally. If they were
attained, if
they were consummated, they would cease to be values. In the words of
Sartre,
“Value is always and everywhere the beyond of all surpassings.”[5] Man’s ultimate effort in the sphere of his
value is to be consumed towards its attainment, as were the Christians
facing the
lions in. Rome, the Buddhist monks in Saigon or the Kamikazes.[6] Different
natures and dimensions of
interest-value relationships can fit our model. For example, speaking
of
commercial profit as an interest, fair play and honesty as a value, and
wealth as
a goal, or likewise of defense, patriotism and glory, we may visualize
the
model as presented in Fig. 4.01.
Fig.
4.01
Man’s behavior, then,
is motivated by a pattern of
interacting and intermingling functional material interests and
affectional transcendental
values. Some interests are more directly goal-oriented and value-free,
while
others, in an increasingly transcending scale, are polarized and
value-laden.
There are those who go after wealth, and there are those who go after
wealth
honestly. Some go for power ruthlessly; some are tempered in their
drive by
their fear of God.
As observed earlier,
the gradation from functionally
goal-oriented interests to transcendental values does not necessarily
parallel
the gradation from man’s physiological needs for survival to his
metaphysical
sublimations. Those very goal-directed physiological needs may
themselves be
conditioned by values. Between the appeal to a prostitute for
satisfaction of
the sex drive, a functional extreme, and the romantic love which may
culminate
in sacrifice, there is a wide spectrum of interest-value combinations
which
influence and regulate man’s sexual behavior and which explain, for
example,
the different institutions of marriage. Not only are the interest-value
patterns not identical for different individuals, but they may be
different for
the same individual under different circumstances.[7]
As in our above example, the same man may both seek the services of a
prostitute and fall in love.
In the preceding
chapters we saw that the group as the
unit of identification needed to set a pattern of behavior for its
members in
order to secure its cohesion. The togetherness of the group under given conditions already presupposes a
group pattern of behavior. But both that pattern and the togetherness
may be
caused by the given conditions which may be external to the group. A
shipwreck
may create a group, but the group may not be long-lasting. For the
group to
secure its continuity in spite of the given external conditions (which
may not always
be conducive to its cohesion but detrimental to it) and not because of
them,
the pattern of social behavior among its members should be ingrained in
them.
The group should be more than an aggregate of heterogeneous people
temporarily
brought together by some external factor, and it should be able to
resist
disintegration in the face of external factors tantalizing its members.
In
discussing groupness in the last chapter, we noticed that communication
and
communion brought about understanding and a sense of belonging. But
what was
being communicated, and what was that communion? We saved this question
for our
present discussion. The survival of the group, the security of its
existence
and its interests in the material and functional sense depend on the
conviction
of its members as to the validity of the group itself. This validity
must be
more than the sum total of private material and functional interests of
the
group’s components, for otherwise conflicting interests will
disintegrate the
group. Without such a transcendent validity, there would be no sense in
risking
one’s life, for example, to be a patriotic soldier on the front.
In the process of
communication and communion, then, more
is passed along than the simple rudiments of how to procure material
satisfaction. The pattern of behavior is enveloped in a sense of
“oughtness,”
making conflicting interests reconcilable and giving the individual a
sense of
values. In the words of Perry:
The
quality of moral goodness,
like the quality of goodness in the fundamental sense, lies not in the
nature
of any class of objects, but in any object or activity whatsoever, in
so far as
this provides a fulfilment of interest or desire. In the case of moral
goodness
this fulfilment must embrace a group of interests in which each is
limited by
the others. Its value lies not only in fulfilment, but also in
adjustment and
harmony. And this value is independent of the special subject-matter of
the
interests.[8]
To create this sense
of values, the group, through
socialization, appeals to affectional ingredients of human nature. We
have
mentioned some of these (such as paternal love, faith and patriotism)
as
transcendental feelings---values—corresponding to functional
institutions (such
as heritage, church and state) which serve material interests. Paternal
love
provides heritage, faith maintains the church, and patriotism secures
the
state.[9]
The group appeals to
man’s nonrational and affectional
inclinations to reinforce and coordinate the interests which are
functional
according to the group rationale, but not necessarily so for the
individual
members. When a man is hungry, he wants to eat; indeed, he must eat in
order to
survive. But if he belongs to a primeval superstitious group, and the
only food
available is the totem animal, and he eats it, he may have convulsions
and die
a voodoo death.[10] In this extreme example the organism
responds to the supernatural value more intensely than to the material
interest, and the value is transformed into an internal norm, carrying
its own
sanction and having psychosomatic consequences. The group’s values
stimulate
the group member, are processed by his organism and condition his
response. The
more the value is straightforward and recognizable as a value and its
impact
regulated and controlled, the less confused the organism will be. The
value’s
efficacy depends on how well the organism has been conditioned to give
the
desired response. The voodoo death is the ultimate, uncommon extreme of
such
conditioning, but it helps us demonstrate rather dramatically the vast
gap that
can exist between values and interests. The taboo on the sacred food
emphasizes
the value that safeguards the group’s structure.
But groups are not
amorphous and, in the last analysis,
their interests and structures should reflect the interests of their
members:
If certain values instilled in group members can be detrimental to
their
interest in terms of survival and security, then they must correspond
to some
other drives of the individual members. If order and justice are
prerequisites
for the group’s continuity, it is because of man’s inner need for
predictability. If for cohesiveness the group fosters a sense of
identity and
communion among its members, it is because of man’s psychological need
for
contact comfort and belonging. And if supernatural belief can bring
about a
voodoo death, it is because man has a drive to search and fear the
unknown.
Thus, despite the gap between them, both values and interests are part
of man’s
reality, of his basic needs and drives.
If man’s drives
engender both his values and interests,
then their common origin may imply an organic relationship. What is the
nature
of that relationship?
III.
Interest-Orienting
Properties of Values
Man’s drives and his
search for their satisfaction are generated
by his consciousness of lacks, whether of food, attachment or eternity.
As we
saw earlier, an interest is the formulation of a need and a move
towards
filling the lacuna. But if the move is haphazard, different interests
may – and in
a social context are bound to –
conflict, jeopardizing the social pattern conducive to satisfying the
drives.
The passage from interests to goals therefore needs some sort of
orientation,
like the molecular magnets in a steel bar which are random when
unmagnetized, but
which are oriented parallel from one pole to another after
magnetization.
Fig. 4.02
Values provide the
field for this orientation of
interests. But as molecular magnets are the same before and after
magnetization, except for their direction in the magnetic field, so
interests
are the same before and after
orientation, except
that some have been sublimated by
values. What we said earlier about the appeal to man’s nonrational
affectional
dimensions to direct the rational and functional should be completed by
the
statement that the appeal is not the point of departure of a
relationship
between two properties other-wise foreign to each other. There is no
such
abstract, independent value as patriotism and another totally separate
entity
as a fatherland; rather, the two are components of an interest-value
constellation which gives meaning to man’s territorial imperative. The
organic
relationship between the affectional and its corresponding
functional—the value
that orients the interest—is causal. Interests and values grow on and
into each
other. We are thus closing the gap between values and interests, but
not to the
extent that pure interest theories do. Both interests and values, as we
have
discussed, emanate from man’s drives and have a circular, organic and
causal
relationship with man’s needs, goals and expectations. Yet they are not
totally
identical. To say that they are, is like saying that the beams produced
by the
flashlight are the same as those produced by the laser because both are
propagations
of light by photons. Such an equation ignores the proportionality of
their
energy and frequency which distinguishes their penetrative potentials.
Transferring our simple metaphor, we may say that values are the
conversion of
interests beyond apparent recognition. Like the laser and the
flashlight,
values and interests are similar up to a certain frequency, intensity
and
concentration, but beyond they reveal different impacts and
consequences.
Liking and wanting become loving—the extrapolation of the ego. The
interest in
security and survival becomes patriotic sacrifice.
Drawing further from
our laser analogy, when man’s
behavior is strictly controlled and directed with intensity within a
field of
values, he is capable of deeds and behavior otherwise beyond the common
realm
of human achievement. We have already referred to some such
extremes—the
sacrifice of the believer, and the primeval man’s voodoo reaction. Like
the
laser, in the process of orientation and intensification, values narrow
their
field and isolate the subject from his surroundings. But we should be
careful
not to follow our analogy with physical phenomena too far because,
unlike the
laser, the consequences of valuational rigidity may, for example, turn
faith
into fanaticism and fanaticism into superstition, thus reducing the
efficacy
and penetration of the values and increasing the group’s vulnerability.
Our
present discussion will gain plasticity if we keep in mind that values
are the
cohesive field for a group. They are the integrative factor in a
homogeneous
group and help orient the members of a heterogeneous group toward
integration.
The results for political organization are obvious.
IV.
Interest-Justifying
Properties of Values
If there is need for a
value field to regulate the passage
from drives to satisfactions, then, in the absence of such a field,
different
interests are likely to clash. The Hobbesian state of nature would
tremendously
reduce the chances for drives to receive satisfaction. In other words,
without
a field of values the chances of filling the lacuna would be scarce,
whether
the basic material for fulfillment is abundant or not. This idea of
lacuna and
scarcity lies deep in the phenomenology of value. It is said that the
creature
most unconscious of water is the fish in the water. The human body
lacks air at
each exhalation, but man is not constantly conscious of air unless it
becomes
polluted or scarce. Maybe we should emphasize here that the concept of
a lack
does not necessarily refer to an absence, but rather to the
consciousness that
absence is possible. The more one is conscious of the irreplaceability
of the
beloved, the more one clings to the beloved. Without that
consciousness, one
takes the beloved for granted. It is not, therefore, so much the
intrinsic abundance
or scarcity of a supply, but rather man’s subjective want and his
consciousness
of that want that provide grounds for the formulation of interests,
elaboration
of their orderly orientation and their sublimation into values. Man’s
subjective perception of a want, independent of the abundance or
scarcity of
its supply, implies that a lacuna can be produced, displaced, magnified
or
reduced by the intervention of values.
As before, we use the
concept of lack and scarcity
universally; i.e., it may refer to a physiological lack, such as water
or food,
or to a spiritual longing for immortality. Our discussion of the
orienting
properties of values implied their sway over the formulation of
interests. Let
us go back for a minute. The orderly orientation provided by values
will, of
course, bring about control over the hypothetical loose and direct
passage from
wants to satisfactions which may have existed in the state of nature.
It
provides a field which in the social context regulates drives towards
filling the
lacuna. But if you look at the position of the arrows in Fig. 4.02, you
will
notice that in the field provided by values, both needs and the
direction of
their fulfillment are modified from their original state-of-nature
position.
That is why in our Fig. 4.01, which was originally inspired by the
concept of a
magnetic field, we placed needs and goals at a lag. Any of our examples
of
interest-value relationships will make the point. For instance, you may
seek
wealth for what it can buy. But in the process of becoming wealthy your
assortment of needs may change and eventually you may consider wealth
itself as
the goal. And if you go after wealth honestly, you may never become
rich, thus
consumed by the value on your way to achieve the goal.
In the state of nature
the social unit, the individual
(illustrated by arrows representing a molecular magnet in Fig. 4.02),
might
have been only a short way from satisfaction for a given want—with a
small
chance of getting it, to be sure, but nevertheless at a short distance.
Once in
the field provided by values, he may have to go through a whole social
process
without necessarily reaching his original goal which, as
our-illustration
suggests, may lie aside from the path which his values provide for his
behavior:
Fig.
4.03
Of course, the
stronger the field created by the value
system in its orienting properties, the less relevant our statement
about
modification of interests and goals. When the value field is not strong
enough,
the subject, feeling the pull of his original drives and goals, may be
inclined
to deviate to satisfy them in a value-free, state-of-nature way. But as
the
pull of the value field intensifies, it overpowers the original drive,
which
must then be taken into account less and less. The lacks that the
individual
seeks to fulfill in the social context cannot always be satisfied by
the
nearest sources. Man has sexual drives, for example, but the incest
taboo makes
him impervious to his children. Our example indeed makes the point that
a
supply may be intrinsically abundant yet be rendered scarce and its
attainment
made subject to certain values in order to regulate its social
distribution and
to create motivations within the group members beneficial for group
interests.
If values can play a
role in making scarce what is
abundant in order to orient interests, it is reasonable to conclude
that they
will also influence those areas where the supply is intrinsically
scarce, in
which case the orientation provided by values is even more crucial,
since there
is not enough to go around. The value system must orient interests
toward their
goals so as to explain and justify the multiple standards which will
permit
some but not others to attain certain goals. The value system will have
to
supply comfort and compensation for those interests which have been
allotted
lesser satisfactions. There again, depending on the impact of the value
system,
we must qualify our statement about the intrinsic scarcity of the
resources
because, as the intensity of the value orientation increases, the
relevance of
our statement decreases. The ideal situation can be hypothesized as one
where
the value system is so well adapted to the social pattern that each
interest
flows towards its own goal orientation and finds its difference from
others
justified. The Sudra cannot be a Brahman; he was born a Sudra. And
those in Brave New World who are not supposed to
have roses are conditioned not to want them. It is when a value system
leaves
loose ends that the feeling of uneven apportionments becomes acute and
threatening. A value system which proclaims opportunity
for all leaves room for a good number of lacks to be filled. If it
does not
provide enough opportunities, it risks having those available
appropriated by
the opportunists and not by all.
Thus, it creates frustrations and
unfulfillable expectations, reducing the effectiveness of that
particular value
system for the group’s cohesion.
A value system, then,
may be called a framework within
which differentiations find justification. These differentiations, in
turn, if
the value system is efficient, provide the scale required to justify
discrepancies and set standards (render unto Caesar the things which
are
Caesar’s). In other words, not only does the value system orient,
adjust and
explain the place and domain of different interests, their title to
different
resources and the conditions for the attainment of certain goals, but
it is
itself contained within them. If eternity is beyond the mortal’s reach,
then it
is the eternal that will dictate the values to ensure life after death
and
salvation for man. If gold is scarce and imperishable (its permanence
defying
man’s destiny to decay), it becomes the standard and its possession is
good;
and those who possess it are those who control. If you are a Brahman
you may
set the rules, but in order to become a Brahman one must die and be
reborn. The
revelations of the eternal, the mercantile doctrine and the Vedic caste
systems
serve their social functions through their value charges (which may be
different
in different situations). By converting the functional into the
affectional,
values justify interests and their discrepancies and attenuate their
conflicts.
(By the same token, conflicting values enhance interest conflicts.)
Interests
in general, and sometimes some of them in particular, promote values.
Of
course, not all interests are value-laden. The difference between
values and
interests resides in their intensities and their possibilities of being
attained. Values, deep-rooted in the affectional and sublimated in
transcendental abstractions, are more intense and less negotiable.
Interests,
having attainable goals in view, compromise and negotiate on their way
towards
their ends.
The relationship of
values and interests becomes apparent
when conflicting interests find it time to compromise, while the values
justifying them lag behind. In such cases the mechanism is set to
modify,
reshape, dilute and disregard the values, or reinterpret and re-explain
them in
the light of other, superior values. Harun-al-Rashid recognized the
protectorate of Charlemagne, the emperor of the infidels, over the Holy
Places
in 807; the Crusaders finally settled down to coexist with the
Mamelukes in
1274; the Catholics and Protestants recognized each other as equals in
1648.
More recently, societies imbued with principles of free enterprise have
resorted to government control of the economy, such as anti-trust laws,
to ward
off crises inherent in their system of values, while regimes based on
Communist
ideals have adopted methods of liberal economy (such as the private
gain
incentive elaborated by the Soviet economist Liberman). On the
international
level, those who had fought Fascism a few years earlier accommodated
Fascist
Franco in the face of the superior Communist threat of the Soviet
Union, which
itself was later transformed into a negotiating partner and turned away
from
its former ally, China, accused of and accusing misinterpretation of
Communist
values. The latter, after 25 years of being an outcast of American
moral
standards, was visited by the President of the United States. The list
is
endless, as it is the very history of mankind.
V.
Metaphysical and Material Variations of Values
While the evolutions
and transformations of values
comprise human history, they are not apparent practices of everyday
life;
otherwise values and interests would become hardly distinguishable.
Values,
intense and irreducible, are latent to change. That is why interests
are turned
into values for their mainstay. This latency, however, is relative. In
the
examples above, the earlier value changes spread over a longer period
of time.
The mobility of the modern world, enhancing rapid social, economic,
technical,
political and ethical changes, develops variegated value structures and
attenuates
some of the transcendency, intensity, irreducibility and therefore
latency of
the values.[11] In a way, the dwindling of values in modern
society, while providing greater material possibilities for diversified
interests, also reduces the gap between values and interests. This, to
some
extent, explains the interchangeable use of the two terms by modern
philosophy
and social sciences. But the modern world is only a fraction of the
world, and
much of what happens in transitional and traditional societies, which
are far
from attaining the economic standards to satisfy their material
interests,
cannot be understood without the concept of value as discussed in the
last
pages. Besides, even the modern world is facing a value crisis. By
confounding
values and interests, by going increasingly after material
satisfactions, the
modern man empties his beyond of its substance. Yet values, besides
serving
social and material interests, are dimensions of human needs in
themselves: If
there were no God, man would have created one.[12]
Our examples of those
who were consumed in their élan
towards the attainment of their values were taken from earlier
Christian Europe
and more recent non-Western cultures, while our discussion of
materialism
centered around modern Western philosophies. The question thus arises
as to
whether there is a correlation between a society’s material development
and the
nature of its values. Without any pretensions of compartmentation, we
may again
attempt to differentiate in shades the relationship between the nature
of
values and certain social dimensions. When we were discussing primeval
subsistence economies earlier, we quoted Redfield as saying that under
such
conditions man called on the supernatural as support for his
livelihood. Other
social studies have shown that in more complex societies appeals to
salvationist religions are more frequent in the deprived groups whose
poor
material conditions in this world are made bearable by promises of
compensation
in the next world.[13] This goes along with Marx’s famous, but
often only partially quoted and therefore misunderstood statement:
“Religion is
the sigh of the creature overwhelmed by misfortune, the sentiment of a
heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium
of the
people.”[14]
When material
conditions provide for good living, the
focus of attention turns from the beyond to within, as has happened
through the
ages in different cultures, among different classes. The apogees of
Greek,
Persian, Roman, Chinese or Indian cultures had material traits similar
to those
of modern Western civilization. They differed from modern Western
civilization,
however, in that their material abundance often turned the appeal to
the
supernatural for livelihood into superstitious rituals. In other words,
abundance alone does not reduce supernatural values to materialistic
ideologies. For that, a dimension of empirical scientific inquiry is
needed.
Among the cultures listed above, those which developed at some time a
noticeably materialistic approach to values, such as the Greek and the
Chinese,
also had an inclination for scientific inquiry free from religious
dogma.
Modern Western culture
turned to scientific materialism
with the decline of natural law doctrines and the age of enlightenment.
Together with the fruits of the industrial revolution, progress and the
ideals
of social justice, material well-being (the good life) became the
ultimate
goal. Life was considered worth living and became a value in itself.
And the
value-polarization of interests on the way to their goals was conducted
within
a comparatively closed field, of which the sanctity of human life and
being was
the approximation rather than consummation of the beyond. ‘But even in
that
context, the man who, striving for power and deference, rationalizes
and wraps
his drive in his great concern for public
interest,[15] may himself become wrapped up in his own
rationalization—a process which lays ground for modern values: ideas,
ideals
and ideologies. This is the process which produces public figures like
Jefferson, Robert Owen, Sun Yat-Sen and Gandhi, who subordinated their
own
power positions to their dedication to a cause.
Despite the
metaphysical-material dichotomy suggested
here, then, there exist different processes of value-building—some
relying on
supernatural sublimations, others emanating from material
rationalizations. In
our next chapter we will examine this aspect of our topic and discuss
the
crystallization of values through beliefs, myths and ideologies.