Chapter
10
Political
power grows out of the barrel of a gun.
Mao Ze-Dong
The gun
that does not
have to shoot is more
eloquent
than the gun that has to shoot and
above
all than the gun which has shot.
Salvador
de Madariaga
We began studying
power in
Chapter Two when we examined man's psychological drive to dominate
other people
and things--the drive by which he complements his security with freedom
of
action. Power has been involved whenever we have examined a
relationship and an
interaction. From the child who charms the candy from his mother to the
group
which inculcates its norms into its members, power is being exercised.
And the
traffic is not just one-way. The mother may not give in, and the member
of the
group can both resist inculcation and influence and modify the norms.
Our present discussion
of the
phenomenon of power, then, is the continuation of what we have been
examining
all along. In that vein, the term "power" is all-pervasive, connoting
the omnipotence of God as well as the energy produced by electricity.
As
Merriam put it, there was power long before there was a written word
for it.
But within the pattern developed in the last chapter, even if we may at
times
make analogies between power and certain elemental manifestations, we
will
concentrate on power as the human actualization of socio-political
fermentations and dynamics. Even within that context, power reveals
itself as
pervasive. How could a child's tantalizing charms, a religion's
imposing
admonitions and a group's social pressures all carry ingredients of
power? To
answer that question we will need to see of what power is made.
I. The
Sources of Power
In the last chapter we
discussed man's ability to extract energy from nature, and also to
exploit his
fellow men to that end. These abilities supplement man's original raw
energy,
giving him additional strength. While exploitation needs some brute
physical
force, our above examples show that power does not depend solely on
physical
strength. The child can hardly be said to be twisting its mother's
arm--literally--to obtain her favors. Brute force can, of course, give
its
holder the possibility of control which lasts as long as the holder is
forcefully superior. But its very simplicity and directness make it
vulnerable
and breakable. Naked force can easily be evaluated and analyzed. It is
like a
piece of stone: it holds only by its weight and rigidity, and when it
hits
other rigid phenomena weaker than itself, it breaks them. When it
encounters
superior force, it breaks. It is only a part of the more complex
phenomenon of
power which, in its flexibility, is like a rubber ball or a spring.
Power has
the potentials of adaptation, resistance and pressure. In its encounter
with a
superior but simpler force it does not break; it can contract or
retreat and
withhold its potentials without being irremediably crushed or broken.
In a
favorable position, it can assume the rigidity of steel and strike
back. Power is. Even when it retracts it makes its
pressure felt. The phenomenon that can be squeezed and takes its new
squeezed
shape without being able to return the pressure is not, in our analogy
of
power, a rubber ball or a spring; it is a piece of dough! Power is by the awe of its presence.[2]
In terms of social
politics,
power can draw from different sources. We have already mentioned brute force whose ingredients range from
the physical (muscular) to certain aspects of the
psychological--stubbornness,
fanaticism or even determination. These latter intangible factors are
included
within the concept of force because
when certain character traits such as stubbornness or fanaticism reach
the
point of rigidified behavioral patterns, they become comparable to
brute force.
The propulsion they produce is forceful, rigid and yet, in its
directness,
vulnerable. Of course, as it is for other sources of power, the
evaluation of
force is subjective. While in a power situation the assumption would be
that if
B submits to A's command it is because
B
finds submitting to A more agreeable
than suffering A's force or coercion,
the preference remains relative.[3]
A masochist perceives pain differently than a paranoiac.
The means
at a power's disposal are obviously of great importance. Means
range from primary tools and
weapons near the force end of the spectrum to more subtle factors such
as money
and wealth.[4] By considering means as the
ingredient of power immediately linked with brute
force, we can understand how mans cultural interaction with his
environment,
through manipulation, exploitation and accumulation, can generate the
sources
of power.
The position
from which power is exercised is another crucial factor.
Like force and means, position
can cover
a spectrum going from the simple instance of a strategic location to
complex
social situations.[5] The president of a bank, the governor of a
state, the justice of the peace each holds a position conducive to
power. We
must note, however, that the aspect of the position we are considering
at this
stage is not totally identical with authority. Authority is the
legitimized
dimension of power which we will discuss in the coming chapter. What we
are
presently considering is neither an office nor exactly the right to
power that
it legitimizes but the power potential that a position can provide even
beyond
the framework of its formal authority. The bank president has the
authority to
sign the grant of loans. But he does so mostly on the advice of his
experts. In
performing that function he may be doing no more than a post office
clerk with
the authority to legalize a signature. Beyond that simple signature,
however,
the bank president holds a position which can radiate power. It depends
very
much on the man and the use he makes of the other ingredients at his
disposal
to wield power by exploiting his position. The bank president who
exercises his
duties strictly for the management of the bank and does not use his
position,
for example, in favor of one faction as against another in a conflict
or an
election, is not using it for what could be power ends. Indeed, if he
does not,
he may not last long in his position unless he is there to buffer
contending
powers. We shall examine similar possibilities in our discussion of
authority.
This dynamic concept
of
position leads us to further sources of power. A power may tap its connections with other powers--not just
vertically but also horizontally and diagonally--to strengthen its own
resources. Power A may call on power C
for help in the A/B power relationship and return
equal help to C in another context. Of course, connection and contact are sine
qua non components of a power complex. In
that sense, power is relational and hierarchical. According to Parsons,
"While the structure of economic power is... lineally quantitative,
simply
a matter of more and less, that of
political power is hierarchical that
is, of higher and lower levels. The
greater power is power over the
lesser, not merely more power than
the lesser."[6] This qualification implies relational
comparability. It is not realistic to compare the power of a Soviet
Kolkhose
official in Siberia with that of the Sheikh of Ras el Kheyma or a
banker in La
Paz. But even where relations exist, one power situation may not imply
another.
For instance, it does not necessarily follow that because A
is more powerful than B,
and B is more powerful than C, A
is more powerful than C. The nature
of the relationships may not be comparable, and until A
and C have become
entangled in a power relationship--whether by the intermediary of B or otherwise--we cannot say that A has
power over C. The A/B relationship
may, for example, be professional, while the B/C
relationship may be paternal or conjugal. The assumption,
however, is that where power relations exist, hierarchical imperatives
arise.
Even the lateral mutual help relationship between distinctly autonomous
power
complexes will not always remain on a par and will be subject to the
interplay
of the whole potentials of the components.
Take, for example, A's need to persuade C that the outcome
of their mutual
assistance will benefit both equally. If A
has good power of persuasion, he may draw a picture showing all the
advantages
to C, although in fact, in the long
run, the outcome may profit A more.
This eventuality permits us to generalize and signal out the power of persuasion as yet another
source of power. For persuading B to
do something profitable to A in a
vertical power relationship is also one of the things A
could do instead of using his force, his material means and
position, or his connections.
To persuade implies
the
capacity to influence or to have influence.
Of course, the simple
fact of having influence may not involve a power relationship. To
illustrate
our point, suppose you told your friend in a restaurant that a certain
stock
was likely to rise on the market, and someone next to your table
overheard your
conversation and as a result bought that stock-something he would not
have done
otherwise. You have influenced him but you have not consciously exerted
power
upon him. Like other ingredients of power, only that part of influence
which
becomes effectively related will be part of a power complex.[7]
The influence exerted
on the
eavesdropper in the restaurant will depend on other factors. He may be
influenced by your confident tone--in other words, your self-confidence.
In general terms, self-confidence can be counted
as a source of power. Its impact is evident when combined with other
ingredients: force, means or position used with self-confidence, and
self-confidence as a dimension of the persuasive process. The
influential statement
may have come from a person with charisma,
which can be defined approximately as an inspirational gift. While
charisma may
be a characteristic in its own right, it is seldom separable from the
power of
persuasion and self-confidence. But it may happen that a charismatic
person is
not self-confident or that he inspires rather than persuades. Still in
the
restaurant, we may find that the eavesdropper is influenced by the
speaker's reputation. He may be influenced even by
the reputation of the restaurant. Suppose he is an amateur investor,
lunching
near Wall Street at a restaurant known as the rendezvous of financial
wizards.
Noticing that his neighbor acts like a habitué of the restaurant, he
assumes
the man to be a stock exchange expert and is therefore impressed by his
words.
Reputation is itself a product of the other components of power:
Consider the
possibilities of combining means (money and mass media) with persuasive
techniques (the contents of mass media programs, based on social
psychology) and,
through publicity and propaganda, creating a power image.
All this suggests, in
the human
context, knowledge and knot-how
which, beyond implying
specialized skills, should include the general
capacity to analyze, to evaluate and to draw appropriate conclusions
for action--including
timing and improvisation, as well as organization
and planning. It is this general
capacity that can establish the relative value of the components of
power, even
the intangible ones such as self-confidence and reputation. A power can
combine
and exploit its potentials to extents which may exceed the
possibilities of any
one of the components in isolation. At times action may appear as a
bluff, that
is, if such potentials as courage and
risk-taking are not (as they should
be) considered components of power. In its analysis of possibilities a
power
should relate its power position to another in the context of total
environment. When Churchill asked his chiefs of staff on British
preparedness
to face the Germans, they replied: "Our conclusion is that prima
facie Germany has most of the
cards; but the real test is whether the morale of our fighting
personnel and
civil population will counterbalance the numerical and material
advantages
which Germany enjoys. We believe it will."[8] Later
events proved them right.
A power should be able
to
analyze and evaluate not only its relationship with another power, but
also the
conflicting natures or simply different textures and shades of other
powers in
their relationships. Thus, one power may use different powers against
each
other or combine some against others in situations beneficial to
itself. Great
Britain remained a great power for some three centuries and into the
twentieth
century partly because it successfully played this balancing game in
the
European power complex.[9]
The range of sources
of power
so far presented has moved from the more elemental to the more
cognizant
dimensions. If, in the social context, knowledge, know-how and the
capacity to
analyze, evaluate and draw appropriate conclusions for action are the
essential
sources of power, then by implication knowledge means the power
holder's
knowledge about the power situation. In other words, power should be conscious of its power. To give a simple
illustration, one may say that the water behind a dam is only force.
Before the
dam was built, the downhill flow of the river was naked force; after
the dam is
built, the water it holds is 'tamed force that generates electric
power. But no
power will be produced if the valves of the dam are not opened and the
water is
not permitted to become active. If
there were no turbines and generators behind the valves, the movement
of water
would turn simply into forceful streams. It is in its contact
with the turbines and generators, which put up a relative
resistance but rotate under the pressure of the forceful stream, that
the
latter becomes effective in
generating power. The power holders, however, are those who created the
plus-potential by holding the water
behind the dam and putting it in contact with the generator, and who
decide on
the distribution of electricity. The power they control is the
potential energy
which the high level of water holds behind the dam. Power
can thus be conceptualized as the conscious plus-potential which
is active, in contact and effective.[10]
*
* *
As our discussion of
the
sources of power has unfolded, you may have noticed that these sources
emanate
from the socio-political phenomena we have covered in preceding
chapters. Our
concern is not only the direct and obvious relationship between the
domination
drive and power, but the elemental and yet intricate intertwining of
the
ingredients of power within the sociopolitical flux. If we look
closely, we
see, for example, that it is the combination of force and man's
manipulative
potentials, (considered in Chapter Nine) which can supply the means.
Further,
the general capacity to analyze, evaluate and draw appropriate
conclusions for
action, timing, improvisation, organization, planning and the
consciousness
imperative of power are all, of course, related to the ability to
choose and to
act (and when it is appropriate not to act[11])
within the total environment. But these are elementary connections and
may, if
taken literally, limit our conception of power. We can gain a more
solid grasp
and wider vision of the all-pervading phenomenon of power by looking at
its
relationships with the more or less abstract socio-political phenomena.
Thus,
when we consider such factors as connection, the power of persuasion or
influence,
we have to bear them in mind not simply as individual attributes but as
sources
emanating from and understandable within the framework of group
dynamics and
prevailing value systems as elaborated in our earlier chapters. In that
perspective power is not exclusively nor even significantly the power
of an
individual but a complex whose nucleus may be, for example, an
ideological
movement.[12] While motor personalities, as discussed in
Chapter Three, do play a role (at times crucial) in that context, their
leadership should be envisioned within the complex whole.
II. The
Spheres of Power
To be active, in
contact and
effective, power must mesh with the elements over which it has power.
In the
process of entanglement to gain control, those who seek domineering
positions
may have to confine their freedom. Power can be likened to a pyramid
because at
every stage of the struggle for domination only some of those at the
bottom
should move up, forming the narrow top strata which will dominate and
"sit"
on the lower strata, the wide base of power. But the pyramid of power
is not a
static geometric form. Its dynamics and fermentations require permanent
exercise and affirmation of the powers which shore it.. Within it there
will be
constant contact, relation, interaction, transaction and counteraction
among
the action complexes which make it a whole (Fig. 10-01).
Fig
10-01
Power, if it is power,
is ever
evolving. We picture it here as a plain pyramid only to simplify our
presentation. Like all other socio-political phenomena, power should
not be
visualized as a solid chunk of concrete but as a flux with every
particle an
interacting factor of the whole. Figuratively speaking, in its dynamics
and
fermentations power should possess the flexibility to transform itself,
whenever appropriate, from extreme weight and rigidity to the
weightlessness of
a light gas. Within any relationship there is an optimum form in which
power,
depending on its texture, functions best. At the rigid extreme it may
exercise
naked force--an effective instrument under certain conditions--while
under
other circumstances it may diffuse and lighten its pressure over its
components
or opponents so that its weight may scarcely be felt, and yet it may
remain in
control.
The top of the pyramid
sits
best, of course, when it can distribute its weight evenly over the
base. In
political terms, this happens when the power exercises equal control
and/or
care over different components of its complex. Depending on its
fluidity, it
may have greater or lesser freedom of action when it shifts its control
and/or
care within a tolerable radius. In position A1 in
Fig. 10-02, the top of the pyramid is distanced from points B
and C of the base and other points along the
connecting lines A1B and A1C as
compared to the A1D line.
Fig.
10-02
A1 either
controls the A1D area of the pyramid
more or
gives it more attention and care. Yet it still seems to be in balance,
because
in its overall situation, its relation to D
compensates its distance from B and C.
In position A2 the
power-holder seems more precarious. It is off balance and may fall. The
shifting of control and emphasis by the summit of the pyramid is, of
course, an
involved process within the different strata of the complex. The point
of
pressure and support may not be uniform from top to bottom. Each point
of
control below the summit may have a greater or lesser radius of
oscillation,
depending on its viscosity. There are, within the complex, "proximate
policy makers," [13]i.e.,
those who exercise or are delegated to exercise power at different
levels and
sectors of the pyramid and thus share the power of the summit (Fig.
10-03).
Fig.
10-03
Again, power is
presented
schematically as a uniform pyramid for the sake of simplicity. For
closer
analysis we may examine a specific section of the pyramid in detail,
making
abstraction of the rest. For a concrete example, let us apply our model
to the
last three Democratic presidential campaigns in the U. S. A. We may see
that
the upper strata of Senator Eugene McCarthy's (A) power
complex (Fig. 10-04) in 1968 reveals his great dependence
on "radical" elements (D).
These elements, who
were off
base as far as the Democratic party apparatus was concerned (B1C1D1), contributed to his
failure to win the party's
nomination at the Chicago convention, which was dominated by party
regulars and
union representatives (B and C). In
this limited study, abstraction
is made of the power base, the Democratic voting population of the
United
States (B2C2D2). In
1972, Senator George McGovern won the Democratic party presidential
nomination
because the "radical" elements within the party apparatus had become
substantial enough to override the party regulars and union leaders.
But then
the party went off base as far as the Democratic voting population of
the
country was concerned. In 1976, Jimmy Carter's campaign machinery as
one
component of the Democratic apparatus moved up the pyramid, despite
some
"stop Jimmy Carter" efforts within the party, and won the election
more on its appeal to the popular base rather than by an all-out
Democratic
party campaign.
Power has the
possibility not
only to oscillate within a radius on a plane as in Fig. 10-02, but to
compress
or dilate, thus creating a more compact or expanded relationship among
its
components (see Fig. 10-05).
Fig.
10-05
It may compress when
it needs
better control of a situation or when the components require a closer
relationship to give better cohesion to the whole. The compression may
also
take place at the base and the power-holder may, or may have to,
relinquish
some grounds in order to keep the same angle of power within the
remaining
components; otherwise a compression from the top, without reducing the
surface
of the bottom, will flatten the power-holder's controlling position.
Flattening
implies reduction of power components, such as a reverse process in a
cumulative economy which, if continued to the extreme, could revert to
a
subsistence level where, as we saw in Chapter Three, there will be few
ingredients
for building a substantial power pyramid. The model applies to such a
variety
of instances as the retreat and regrouping of an army, the retrenchment
of a
business, or reduction in the international commitments of a nation.
The dilation may occur
when a
condensation within the complex calls for the easing of power controls.
It may
also be a prelude to an elation of power strata preparing for further
expansion. But an elation without possibilities for expansion at the
base,
distancing the upper-strata of the power complex from the base, may
reduce its
stability. For example, in the 1960's de Gaule played superpower
foreign policy
without adequate means, remaining aloof from certain crucial French
domestic
problems. The result was dissatisfaction and alienation of some sectors
of his
popular base, culminating in the 1968 events and the uprising of the
students.
Shifts, compressions or dilations of power create different relationships and ratios within the power complex, upsetting the prevailing habituations, frustrations and expectations, and perhaps eventually changing its nature and course. A party leadership which starts to emphasize workers' rights will eventually embrace more the ideologies of trade unionism and socialism than those of free enterprise and conservative land ownership. The shift may take place because of a prior trade unionist penetration into the party leadership (see Fig. 10-06), or because party policy-makers, although not of trade unionist origin themselves, may have detected favorable grounds among the workers. In the latter case, if the emphasis persists, the party's rank-and-file may gradually be penetrated by trade unionist elements.
Fig.
10-06
In general terms,
growing
emphasis on the role of certain sectors of the power complex may amount
to the
passage of some power potentials to those sectors- a trend which may
not be
reversible and which may eventually change the power relationship
patterns or
even the nature of the power complex. A father who permits his son to
use the family
car, both to make the son more useful in doing family errands and to
give his
son more liberty, will have less control over the car than before. It
will be
difficult to revert to the earlier situation and prohibit his son's use
of the
car without compensation or friction. Similarly, the industrialist who,
after
having run his enterprise on the basis of his individual will and
decision-making, agrees to consider the views of the workers, will have
a hard
time reverting to individual rule. But his recognition of the workers'
views,
although changing the power relationship, may create more interest and
incentive in the workers, increase production, and in the long run give
the
industrialist possibilities of expansion. It has, nevertheless, changed
the power
relationship within the pyramid.
In dilation of a power
complex,
the sum total of control is not reduced but diffused and dispersed
among the
different strata and components of the complex. The
liberalization of the Catholic Church ever since John XXIII
and Paul VI gave new vigor and credibility to the faith, but at the
same time
made open dissent
among the clergy
possible on such matters as birth control. Khrushchev's recognition of
the
possibility of national roads to socialism (which Tito had advocated)
loosened
the lid which Stalin had placed tightly over Eastern Europe. It
resulted in the
uprising in Hungary and later liberalizations in other Eastern European
countries. The Soviet Union had to use force in both Hungary and
Czechoslovakia
to maintain its control and power. In this case the controlled elements
in a
situation of dilation moved towards disintegrating the very power
structure
itself. But in the process of liberalization, the relationship of the
Soviet
Union with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe changed. Even
after
military occupation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia (and in the case of
Rumania,
whose integrity it respected more), the Soviet power did not impose its
total
will on a party and a people which had undertaken a new direction. The
dilation
created by de-Stalinization within the Soviet Union and the socialist
countries
of Eastern Europe diffused to some extent the power which had until
then been
quasi-totally held by the Soviet Union. In exchange, despite its
military interventions,
the Soviet Union gained influence among the Third World countries and
even in
the Western world. One may argue that the Soviet Union would have
gained even
greater influence in other parts of the world had it not used naked
force
against the deviations in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. But timing and
dosage of
the use of power and its dilation or compression are complicated. Had
the
Soviet Union not intervened in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the
dispersion and
diffusion of power may have had consequences which would have changed
beyond
recognition the very nature of Soviet power. Such alteration could not
have
taken place solely in the relationship and ratio of control within that
power
complex, but also in relation to factors beyond it and potentially
detrimental
to its very existence.
Combining the
different
dimensions of power dynamics as illustrated by pyramidal configurations
in the
last pages, we may, by superimposing Figs. 10-1, 10-02, 10-03 and
10-05,
visualize a power complex as a sphere with the power nucleus at its
center of
gravity (see Fig. 10-07). The power complex thus represented will
resemble the
physical illustration of atomic structures.
Fig.
10-07
Let us remember,
however, that
power within the human context has its complicated laws of fermentation
and
dynamics and is not, with our present knowledge of electronic and
mechanical
phenomena, easily and simply reducible to an illustration of an atom.
Accordingly, if we were to use the atomic model to illustrate it, we
would at
least have to add to it loops, broken lines and zigzags!
If you look closely at Fig. 10-07, you will
notice that some such possibilities have been incorporated, with our
apologies
to the atomic scientists.
But above all, the
point made
earlier about the necessity for contact implies that power, in human
social
terms, is perceivable only in relation to other power complexes. Power,
whether
individual or social, does not operate in
vacuo. In the social context, when a power complex becomes so
close-knit as
to retire into a shell, with the domineering and dominated components
absolutely consumed in their relational circuit, the totality that
ensues
should be taken into account as one entity which may have enclosed
potential
power but which is not realized until it encounters other power
complexes. It
is like a body in good physical and psychological health in which the
kidney
and the nose each perform their functions as part of the whole and do
not
exercise power over each other. In order to exist as power, that body
should
come into contact with its environment, i.e., spheres of other powers.
In a
vacuum it is as good as dead.
Power is a
relationship. It
involves domination and submission. Even in the personal power
relationship
between parents and child, what remains outside that particular complex
is apt
to create other power relations. Beyond the limitations and permissions
of the
parent-child relationship, the child fits into other environmental
situations.
His relationship with his peers or even his imaginary domination of his
toys or
his pet engender attitudes often influencing his behavior in the
parent-child
complex. But this is an extreme example. In the social context power
complexes
operate promiscuously. They often overlap and interpenetrate each other
and, in
their spherical dynamics, conflict, cohabit, compromise or cooperate.
Vacuums
do not remain vacuums. When the United Kingdom, moving to compress its
area of
control after the components of its power had thinned out, announced
its
withdrawal from the east of the Suez Canal, the expanding U. S., U. S.
S. R.
and other local powers prepared to take over.
In the struggle for
domination
and power, the hierarchy of complexes does not organize itself without
clashes,
gropings, repeated encounters, perseverance and challenges. Clashes may
keep
some contenders aloof from each other, in which case no power
relationship is
established between them. The power that can be generated will depend
on the
combination of the domineering and submitting factors and the extent to
which
they fuse and amalgamate. As we examine the relational nature of power,
it
seems that power cannot be conceived alone. It needs at least two
components,
power and its antimony. In the social context the consciousness of
power will
tend to call for the consciousness of the elements over which it has
power.
What is the power which is not challenged? Like Caligula, power may
push its
docile subjects to the brink of revolt in order to feel their
resistance and
thus feel itself.[14]
Power, then, is
conditional to
resistance to such an extent that it cannot be conceived without it. In
the
words of Solzhenitsyn, "You are strong only as long as you don't
deprive
people of everything. For a person
you've taken everything from is no
longer in your power."[15] It follows that the resistance to power may
be external or internal in varying degrees and that in the absence of a
relatively external challenge, in order to substantiate its dynamics,
power
will ferment resistance from within. Indeed, the fermentation for
resistance
should not start only when the comparatively foreign challenge has
ceased; its
germs should be ever present within the power so that power does not
cease to
exist when the external challenge is absent. This existential
relational nature
of power thus implies that resistance is part and parcel of power,
without
which it may collapse or rot. Lord Acton's "Power tends to corrupt and
absolute power corrupts absolutely,"[16]
is not a moral maxim but an empirically conceptualizable statement.
The recognition of
resistance
as a component of power reverts us to such socio-political dimensions
as the
domination drive and its potentials for spiralling into an end in
itself, or
group dynamics with different degrees of integration and possibilities
of overintegration
and disintegration, or, still, the attitude of group members within a
spectrum
from conformity to revolt. In other words, power as the engendered
energy of
culture should not be conceived as a locomotive pulling the train of
culture
along the tracks. Power complexes in their inter- and intradynamics and
fermentations present different degrees of integration and entanglement
which
may at times cancel each other out, leaving a culture with its
internecine
power conflicts having little energy. It is the consciousness of power
complexes within a culture about the potentials of power as the raw
material
for socio-political organization, and the way power components and
complexes
involved in a culture are stratified and their integrative and
competitive potentials
actualized, that gives a culture its impulse. That consciousness is the
strain
within a culture which we shall identify as political culture, the
subject of
our next chapter.
[1] For a more elaborate version of this chapter see: A. Khoshkish. Power or Authority?: The Entelechy of Power, Lanham, University Press of America, 1991. Or go to Power on this site.
[2] Churchill, speaking of the movements of the German battle ship Tirpitz towards the P. 0. 17 convoy to the Soviet Union in the Arctic in World War II, says: "The potential threat which they created had caused the scattering of the convoy. Thus their mere presence in these waters had directly contributed to a remarkable success for them": Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, IV (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 265.
[3] We are using letters of the alphabet as a general notation to designate power complexes. A, B, C...may represent individuals, groups, countries, etc.
[4] We are using the term "means" in a stricter sense and in a different context than do the authors mentioned in endnote 1 of this chapter. The term "means" can, of course, be given a broad connotation, as in the combination of "means and ends." Some have even gone as far as emphasizing their preponderance over ends. See what Gandhi says: "They say 'means are after all means.' I would say 'means are after all everything.' As the means so the end. There is no wall of separation between means and end. Indeed the Creator has given us control (and that too very limited) over means, none over the end. Realization of the goal is in exact proportion to that of the means. This is a proposition that admits of no exception." Quoted in Nirmal Kumar Bose, Selections from Gandhi (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1948), p. 37.
[5] In his disheartening popular bestseller Michael Korda lists a whole array of power "positions," from the power spot in a cocktail party to the location of an office and the arrangements within it. It is disheartening because as you walk out of an elevator and into a cocktail party or an executive office you realize that human beings do indeed play the silly games Korda says they play. Michael Korda, Power: How to Get It, How to Use It (New York: Random House, 1975).
[6] Parsons, The Social System, p. 126.
[7] Note our specification of influence as one of the ingredients of power. Others, such as Dahl, have used the term as an encompassing substitute for power.
[8] Churchill, The Second World War, II (1949), 89.
[9] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 189. Some game theories have covered similar instances. See, for example, the concept of pivotal power in L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," APSR, 48:787-792 (1954).
[10] For a mechanical illustration of consciousness developing into its human dimension, see Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, pp. 98 ff.
[11] For a discussion of the power not to act see Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Decisions and Nonedecisions," APSR, 57:641-651 (1963).
[12]
In
his "three dimensional view of power"--covering political agenda,
latent conflict as well as subjective and real interests--Lukes
immerses the
study of power in the systemic and systematic dimensions of ideology.
Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974); Alan Bradshaw, "A Critique of Steven Lukes` Power: A Radical View," Sociology, 10:121-127 (1976); and Lukes' "Reply to Bradshaw," Ibid., pp. 129-32. Without denying the validity of that approach, we believe that it dilutes the issue. Our focus in this chapter on power should, of course, be kept in the perspective of the whole book covering not only the ideological but also other dimensions of power in dealing with such topics as social semantics, political culture, and bourgeois nationalism.
[13] Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 70 ff.
[14] Game-theory experiments have shown, for example, that in a two-person zerosum game with saddle point, the subjects who figured out the saddle point (which secured their winning control in the game) persisted in taking risks and losing in order to alleviate boredom and "to make the game interesting." In another game experiment it was observed that participants considered competing and conquering the opponent more significant than cooperating with the opponent for the purpose of lucrative gain. Bernhardt Lieberman, "Human Behavior in a Strictly Determined 3 x 3 Matrix Game," Behavioral Science, 5:317-322 (1960). J. Sayer Minas et al., "Some Descriptive Aspects of Two-Person Non-Zero-Sum Games. II," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 4:193-197 (1960).
[15] Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 83.
[16] John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, First Baron Acton, Essays on Freedom and Potter (Glencoe, I11.: Free Press, 1949), p. 364.